Professor Christoph Kelp

  • Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy)

Biography

I am Director of COGITO Epistemology Research Centre and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. In addition, I am Director of The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge and on the steering committees of the European Epistemology Network and the Social Epistemology Network. I am also a member of the editorial board of The Philosophical Quarterly.

My publications include The Nature and Normativity of Defeat (CUP, 2023) Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding (OUP, 2021), Sharing Knowledge. A Functionalist Account of Asssertion (with M. Simion, CUP, 2021), Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology (Routledge 2018), and Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (with J. Greco, CUP, 2020). In 2017, my paper 'Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge' won the Young Epistemologist Prize.

Research interests

  • Epistemology

Knowledge, understanding, epistemic justification, epistemic normativity, virtue epistemology, knowledge first epistemology,the relation between epistemology and inquiry, divide, social epistemology, scepticism

  • Philosophy of language

Conceptual engineering, semantics, the nature of assertion

  • Philosophy of science

Scientific inquiry, understanding, opinion dynamics

  • Ethics

Blame, blameworthiness, trust, trustworthiness, moral understanding, moral assertion

 

Publications

List by: Type | Date

Jump to: 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2009 | 2008
Number of items: 78.

2024

Kelp, C. and Jope, M. (2024) Closure and the structure of justification. Philosophical Studies, (Accepted for Publication)

2023

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Kelp, C. (2023) Agent functionalism. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Kelp, C. (2023) How to be a capacitist. Synthese, 201(5), 169. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04143-0)

Kelp, C. (2023) The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Series: Cambridge Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

2022

Kelp, C. (2022) Defeat and proficiencies. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 82-103. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12223)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

2021

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

Kelp, C. (2021) Theory of inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), pp. 359-384. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12719)

Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780192896094

Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, knowledge and understanding. Synthese, 198(7), pp. 1583-1593. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1803-y)

2020

Kelp, C. (2020) The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5093-5100. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02897-5)

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Kelp, C. (2020) Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 192-204. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12180)

Kelp, C. (2020) Moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(3), pp. 639-649. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10107-x)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Kelp, C. (2020) Introduction: virtue theoretic epistemology. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-14. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.001)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Kelp, C. (2020) Utopie und Funktion. In: Zamp Kelp, G. and Engel, L. (eds.) Luftschlosser. Spector: Leipzig. ISBN 9783959053273

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (Eds.) (2020) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. ISBN 9781108481212

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

2019

Kelp, C. (2019) The knowledge norm of blaming. Analysis, 80(2), pp. 256-261. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anz043)

Kelp, C. (2019) Inquiry and the transmission of knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(2), pp. 298-310. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12489)

Kelp, C. (2019) The status of reflection in virtue epistemology. In: Silva Filho, W. J. and Tateo, L. (eds.) Thinking About Oneself: the Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology. Series: Philosophical studies series (141). Springer, pp. 33-43. ISBN 9783030182656 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_3)

Kelp, C. (2019) How to be a reliabilist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(2), pp. 346-374. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12438)

2018

Kelp, C. (2018) Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 9781138317697

Kelp, C. (2018) Assertion: a function first account. Noûs, 52(2), pp. 411-442. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12153)

2017

Kelp, C. (2017) Knowledge first virtue epistemology. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 223-245. ISBN 9780198716310

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. (2017) Lotteries and justification. Synthese, 194(4), pp. 1233-1244. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0989-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

Kelp, C. (2017) Towards a knowledge-based account of understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 251-271. ISBN 9781138921931

2016

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Kelp, C. (2016) Justified belief: knowledge first-style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(1), pp. 79-100. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12272)

Kelp, C. (2016) Epistemic Frankfurt cases revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(1), pp. 27-37.

Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Perceptual justification: factive reasons and fallible virtues. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 164-183. ISBN 9781138925168

2015

Kelp, C. (2015) Understanding phenomena. Synthese, 192(12), pp. 3799-3816. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-014-0616-x)

Kelp, C. (2015) Sosa on knowledge, assertion and value. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 229-237. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9622-0)

2014

Kelp, C. (2014) Unreflective epistemology. Episteme, 11(4), pp. 411-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.21)

Kelp, C. (2014) Epistemology extended. Philosophical Issues, 24, pp. 230-252. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12032)

Kelp, C. (2014) Two for the knowledge goal of inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(3), pp. 227-232.

Decock, L., Douven, I., Kelp, C. and Wenmackers, S. (2014) Knowledge and approximate knowledge. Erkenntnis, 79(S6), pp. 1129-1150. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9544-2)

Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3)

Kelp, C. (2014) No justification for lottery losers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2), pp. 205-217. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12025)

Kelp, C. (2014) Knowledge, understanding, and virtue. In: Fairweather, A. (ed.) Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Series: Synthese Library (366). Springer: Cham ; Heidelberg ; New York, pp. 347-360. ISBN 9783319046716 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_20)

2013

Kelp, C. (2013) A practical explication of the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. European Journal of Philosophy, 21(3), pp. 367-383. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00451.x)

Kelp, C. (2013) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 245-252. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9301-3)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2013) Proper bootstrapping. Synthese, 190(1), pp. 171-185. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-012-0115-x)

Kelp, C. (2013) How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 88, pp. 211-225. (doi: 10.1163/9789401210508_011)

Kelp, C. (2013) Knowledge: the safe-apt view. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 265-278. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.673726)

2012

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2012) In defense of the rational credibility account: a reply to Casalegno. Dialectica, 66(2), pp. 289-297. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x)

Kelp, C. (2012) How and how not to take on Brueckner's sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly, 62(247), pp. 386-391. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00035.x)[Book Review]

Kelp, C. (2012) Do 'contextualist cases' support contextualism? Erkenntnis, 76(1), pp. 115-120. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9330-y)

Kelp, C. (2012) Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 513-521. (doi: 10.2143/TVF.74.3.2174107)

Kelp, C. and Douven, I. (2012) Sustaining a rational disagreement. In: de Regt, H. W., Hartmann, S. and Okasha, S. (eds.) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Series: The European philosophy of Science Association proceedings (1). Springer: Dordrecht, pp. 101-110. ISBN 9789400724037 (doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_10)

2011

Kelp, C. (2011) Not without justification. Dialectica, 65(4), pp. 581-595. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01286.x)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2011) Truth approximation, social epistemology, and opinion dynamics. Erkenntnis, 75(2), pp. 271-283. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9295-x)

Kelp, C. (2011) In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179(3), pp. 409-433. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y)

Kelp, C. (2011) What's the point of 'knowledge' anyway? Episteme, 8(1), pp. 53-66. (doi: 10.3366/epi.2011.0006)

Kelp, C. (2011) A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 152(2), pp. 287-292. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-009-9480-9)

Kelp, C. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (2011) Second-order knowledge. In: Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Series: Routledge philosophy companions. Routledge: London, pp. 586-596. ISBN 9780415962193 (doi: 10.4324/9780203839065.ch53)

2009

Kelp, C. (2009) Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge - Jennifer Lackey. Philosophical Quarterly, 59(237), pp. 748-750. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.645_4.x)[Book Review]

Kelp, C. (2009) Knowledge and safety. Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, pp. 21-31. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2009_1)

Kelp, C. (2009) Pritchard on knowledge, safety, and cognitive achievements. Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, pp. 51-53. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2009_6)

Kelp, C. (2009) Pritchard on virtue epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(4), pp. 583-587. (doi: 10.1080/09672550903164426)

Kelp, C. (2009) Standards zur Bewertung von Architektur: ein funktionsbasierter Ansatz. In: Zamp Kelp, G. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Eine Suche nach dem vibrierenden Nerv unserer Zeit. UdK Buchshop: Berlin.

Kelp, C. and Pritchard, D. (2009) Two deflationary approaches to Fitch-style reasoning. In: Salerno, J. (ed.) New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 324-338. ISBN 9780199285495 (doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0021)

2008

Kelp, C. (2008) Classical invariantism and the puzzle of fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), pp. 221-244. (doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00077.x)

This list was generated on Sun Oct 13 19:53:42 2024 BST.
Number of items: 78.

Articles

Kelp, C. and Jope, M. (2024) Closure and the structure of justification. Philosophical Studies, (Accepted for Publication)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2023) What is trustworthiness? Noûs, 57(3), pp. 667-683. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12448)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Linguistic innovation for gender terms. Inquiry, (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222155) (Early Online Publication)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2023) Trustworthy artificial intelligence. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2(1), 8. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00063-5)

Kelp, C. (2023) How to be a capacitist. Synthese, 201(5), 169. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04143-0)

Kelp, C. (2022) Defeat and proficiencies. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), pp. 82-103. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12223)

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Kelp, C. (2021) Theory of inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), pp. 359-384. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12719)

Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, knowledge and understanding. Synthese, 198(7), pp. 1583-1593. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1803-y)

Kelp, C. (2020) The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5093-5100. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02897-5)

Kelp, C. , Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F., Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H. and Simion, M. (2020) Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. Synthese, 197(12), pp. 5187-5202. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Conceptual innovation, function first. Noûs, 54(4), pp. 985-1002. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12302)

Kelp, C. (2020) Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 192-204. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12180)

Kelp, C. (2020) Moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(3), pp. 639-649. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-020-10107-x)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) How to be an anti-reductionist. Synthese, 197(7), pp. 2849-2866. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), pp. 125-137. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5)

Kelp, C. (2019) The knowledge norm of blaming. Analysis, 80(2), pp. 256-261. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anz043)

Kelp, C. (2019) Inquiry and the transmission of knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(2), pp. 298-310. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12489)

Kelp, C. (2019) How to be a reliabilist. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(2), pp. 346-374. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12438)

Kelp, C. (2018) Assertion: a function first account. Noûs, 52(2), pp. 411-442. (doi: 10.1111/nous.12153)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Commodious knowledge. Synthese, 194(5), pp. 1487-1502. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3)

Kelp, C. (2017) Lotteries and justification. Synthese, 194(4), pp. 1233-1244. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0989-5)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2017) Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), pp. 76-93. (doi: 10.5840/jphil201711426)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2016) The tertiary value problem and the superiority of knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4), pp. 397-409.

Simion, M. , Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues, 26, pp. 374-392. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12077)

Kelp, C. (2016) Justified belief: knowledge first-style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(1), pp. 79-100. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12272)

Kelp, C. (2016) Epistemic Frankfurt cases revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(1), pp. 27-37.

Kelp, C. (2015) Understanding phenomena. Synthese, 192(12), pp. 3799-3816. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-014-0616-x)

Kelp, C. (2015) Sosa on knowledge, assertion and value. Erkenntnis, 80(1), pp. 229-237. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9622-0)

Kelp, C. (2014) Unreflective epistemology. Episteme, 11(4), pp. 411-422. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.21)

Kelp, C. (2014) Epistemology extended. Philosophical Issues, 24, pp. 230-252. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12032)

Kelp, C. (2014) Two for the knowledge goal of inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(3), pp. 227-232.

Decock, L., Douven, I., Kelp, C. and Wenmackers, S. (2014) Knowledge and approximate knowledge. Erkenntnis, 79(S6), pp. 1129-1150. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9544-2)

Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9527-3)

Kelp, C. (2014) No justification for lottery losers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(2), pp. 205-217. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12025)

Kelp, C. (2013) A practical explication of the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. European Journal of Philosophy, 21(3), pp. 367-383. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00451.x)

Kelp, C. (2013) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erkenntnis, 78(2), pp. 245-252. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9301-3)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2013) Proper bootstrapping. Synthese, 190(1), pp. 171-185. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-012-0115-x)

Kelp, C. (2013) How to motivate anti-luck virtue epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 88, pp. 211-225. (doi: 10.1163/9789401210508_011)

Kelp, C. (2013) Knowledge: the safe-apt view. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 265-278. (doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.673726)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2012) In defense of the rational credibility account: a reply to Casalegno. Dialectica, 66(2), pp. 289-297. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x)

Kelp, C. (2012) Do 'contextualist cases' support contextualism? Erkenntnis, 76(1), pp. 115-120. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9330-y)

Kelp, C. (2012) Tegen Scepticisme over de Waarde van Kennis. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 74(3), pp. 513-521. (doi: 10.2143/TVF.74.3.2174107)

Kelp, C. (2011) Not without justification. Dialectica, 65(4), pp. 581-595. (doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01286.x)

Douven, I. and Kelp, C. (2011) Truth approximation, social epistemology, and opinion dynamics. Erkenntnis, 75(2), pp. 271-283. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9295-x)

Kelp, C. (2011) In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179(3), pp. 409-433. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-009-9681-y)

Kelp, C. (2011) What's the point of 'knowledge' anyway? Episteme, 8(1), pp. 53-66. (doi: 10.3366/epi.2011.0006)

Kelp, C. (2011) A problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 152(2), pp. 287-292. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-009-9480-9)

Kelp, C. (2009) Knowledge and safety. Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, pp. 21-31. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2009_1)

Kelp, C. (2009) Pritchard on knowledge, safety, and cognitive achievements. Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, pp. 51-53. (doi: 10.5840/jpr_2009_6)

Kelp, C. (2009) Pritchard on virtue epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(4), pp. 583-587. (doi: 10.1080/09672550903164426)

Kelp, C. (2008) Classical invariantism and the puzzle of fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 46(2), pp. 221-244. (doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00077.x)

Books

Kelp, C. (2023) The Nature and Normativity of Defeat. Series: Cambridge Elements. Cambridge University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2021) Sharing Knowledge: a Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009036818 (doi: 10.1017/9781009036818)

Kelp, C. (2021) Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780192896094

Kelp, C. (2018) Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 9781138317697

Book Sections

Kelp, C. (2023) Agent functionalism. In: Sylvan, K. (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Wiley Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)

Simion, M. , Carter, J. A. and Kelp, C. (2022) On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge. ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)

Boult, C., Kelp, C. , Schnurr, J. and Simion, M. (2020) Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 42-57. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.003)

Kelp, C. (2020) Introduction: virtue theoretic epistemology. In: Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (eds.) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, pp. 1-14. ISBN 9781108481212 (doi: 10.1017/9781108666404.001)

Simion, M. and Kelp, C. (2020) Assertion: the constitutive norms view. In: Goldberg, S. C. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780190675233 (doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.2)

Kelp, C. (2020) Utopie und Funktion. In: Zamp Kelp, G. and Engel, L. (eds.) Luftschlosser. Spector: Leipzig. ISBN 9783959053273

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (2020) A social epistemology of assertion. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (Accepted for Publication)

Kelp, C. (2019) The status of reflection in virtue epistemology. In: Silva Filho, W. J. and Tateo, L. (eds.) Thinking About Oneself: the Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology. Series: Philosophical studies series (141). Springer, pp. 33-43. ISBN 9783030182656 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-18266-3_3)

Kelp, C. (2017) Knowledge first virtue epistemology. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C. and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 223-245. ISBN 9780198716310

Kelp, C. (2017) Towards a knowledge-based account of understanding. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C. and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 251-271. ISBN 9781138921931

Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. (2016) Perceptual justification: factive reasons and fallible virtues. In: Mi, C., Slote, M. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 164-183. ISBN 9781138925168

Kelp, C. (2014) Knowledge, understanding, and virtue. In: Fairweather, A. (ed.) Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Series: Synthese Library (366). Springer: Cham ; Heidelberg ; New York, pp. 347-360. ISBN 9783319046716 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_20)

Kelp, C. and Douven, I. (2012) Sustaining a rational disagreement. In: de Regt, H. W., Hartmann, S. and Okasha, S. (eds.) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Series: The European philosophy of Science Association proceedings (1). Springer: Dordrecht, pp. 101-110. ISBN 9789400724037 (doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_10)

Kelp, C. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (2011) Second-order knowledge. In: Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Series: Routledge philosophy companions. Routledge: London, pp. 586-596. ISBN 9780415962193 (doi: 10.4324/9780203839065.ch53)

Kelp, C. (2009) Standards zur Bewertung von Architektur: ein funktionsbasierter Ansatz. In: Zamp Kelp, G. and Kelp, C. (eds.) Eine Suche nach dem vibrierenden Nerv unserer Zeit. UdK Buchshop: Berlin.

Kelp, C. and Pritchard, D. (2009) Two deflationary approaches to Fitch-style reasoning. In: Salerno, J. (ed.) New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 324-338. ISBN 9780199285495 (doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.003.0021)

Book Reviews

Kelp, C. (2012) How and how not to take on Brueckner's sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly, 62(247), pp. 386-391. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00035.x)[Book Review]

Kelp, C. (2009) Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge - Jennifer Lackey. Philosophical Quarterly, 59(237), pp. 748-750. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.645_4.x)[Book Review]

Edited Books

Kelp, C. and Greco, J. (Eds.) (2020) Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. ISBN 9781108481212

Edited Journals

Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2023) Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology. Synthese. [Edited Journal] (In Press)

Carter, J. A. , Kelp, C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]

Carter, J. A. , Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C. , Lyons, J. C. and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Epistemology. Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]

This list was generated on Sun Oct 13 19:53:42 2024 BST.

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